![]() IEEE (2002)īrasser, F., Davi, L., Gens, D., Liebchen, C., Sadeghi, A.R.: Can’t touch this: software-only mitigation against rowhammer attacks targeting kernel memory. In: International Electron Devices Meeting, IEDM 2002, pp. 51(4), 743–755 (2016)īaumann, R.: The impact of technology scaling on soft error rate performance and limits to the efficacy of error correction. KeywordsĪweke, Z.B., et al.: ANVIL: software-based protection against next-generation rowhammer attacks. ![]() Finally, we evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed attack and show that the proposed mitigation almost perfectly defends against rowhammer attacks. ![]() In addition, we introduce a novel and efficient rowhammer method and improve existing mitigations that has a security hole caused by the faulty assumption. In this paper, we introduce a method to reverse engineer the exact mapping algorithm and demonstrate that the assumption in previous rowhammer work is faulty. Hence, it is important to know the mapping algorithm which maps between physical addresses and physical row indexes not only for an attack but also for protection. In DRAM, however, the physical addresses of neighboring rows are not always contiguous even if they are located before or after a target row. To perform sophisticated rowhammer attacks, attackers need to repeatedly access the neighboring rows of target data. Rowhammer attacks intentionally induce bit flips to corrupt victim’s data whose integrity must be guaranteed. ![]()
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